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THE WOOD PULP CASE: THE APPLICATION
OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
COMPETITION LAW TO FOREIGN
BASED UNDERTAKINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
The realities of foreign commerce today reveal the deficiency of
traditional theories of jurisdiction in defining the permissible scope
of application of a state's competition law to foreign-based under-
takings.' The lack of spatial containment of foreign commerce often
frustrates the attempted application by states of their competition
laws based on nationality, place of business, domicile, or residence.2
The formulation of new jurisdictional doctrines and diplomatic meth-
ods addressing the activities of foreign undertakings is necessary to
avoid allowing the transnational character of a restrictive business
practice to remove that practice from the ambit of a State's law.'
The recent decision of the European Court of Justice in Re Wood
Pulp Cartel: A. Ahlstrom Oy and Others v. E.C. Commission (Wood
Pulp)4 represents that Court's implicit recognition of the limits of
the traditional principles of jurisdiction, namely the territoriality prin-
ciple. While the Court purports in the decision to validate the ju-
risdiction of the European Commission to apply EC competition law
to the restrictive activities of foreign-based wood pulp producers under
I An "undertaking" is a legal or physical person. 2 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY § 85.11, pt. 3, at'90-94 (the authors
use the term "enterprise" in the place of undertaking; see 88.05 at 3-81). This paper
will use the term undertaking.
2 For this reason, the competition laws of a state can not be confined in their
application solely to activities occurring within the sovereign's territory. J. Castel,
Extraterritorial Effects of Antitrust Laws, 179 RECUEIL DES COURS, ACADEMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 13, 22 (1983). But see United Kingdom Aide-Memoire of 20
October 1969 to Commission of the European Communities, reprinted in I. BROWN-
LIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 310, 313 (1979) [hereinafter Aide-
Memoire].
I Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 1972-73 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 145,
192.
4 [89/85, 114/85, 116-117/85, 125-129/85] [1988] 4 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 901
(1988).
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the doctrine of territoriality, the jurisdictional standard actually prom-
ulgated resembles more closely the classic "effects doctrine" first
formulated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America.'
The Court's reluctance to expressly adopt the effects doctrine ap-
pears to stem from its desire to avoid the conflict that the effects
doctrine often creates between a sovereign's rights and international
law. As a result of this reluctance, the Court fails to devise a standard
of jurisdiction that adequately defines Community policy concerning
competition regulation other than to reaffirm the broad scope of
application exercised by the Commission in this case.
II. BACKGROUND
A state's right to prescribe and apply its laws to persons, goods,
and resources located within its territory is an essential attribute of
state sovereignty.6 Implicit in a state's right to assert jurisdiction is
a reciprocal duty not to infringe upon the sovereign rights of other
states. 7 This principle, the jurisdictional doctrine of territoriality,
defines the traditional parameters of a state's jurisdiction.'
The traditional formulation of territoriality underwent a contro-
versial expansion in the Permanent Court of International Justice's
decision in the S.S. Lotus case.9 On August 2, 1926 a French mail
steamer, the S.S. Lotus, struck a Turkish vessel, the Boz-Kourt, on
the high seas, splitting the latter vessel in half. 0 Eight Turkish na-
tionals died in the collision."
After securing the presence of the captain of the French vessel,
the Turkish Criminal Court of Stamboul conducted proceedings against
1 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
6 F. Mann, The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited after Twenty
Years, 186 RECUEIL DES COURS, ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 13, 20 (1984).
Id.
I Id. The principle of territoriality flows from the principles of sovereignty and
equality of states. This universally accepted norm divides jurisdictional competence
into territorial subdivisions over which each state may exercise its sovereign powers.
Castel, supra note 2, at 27.
9 (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10. Although the S.S.Lotus addressed
jurisdiction in the criminal context, many have cited the case for the proposition
that "any state may impose liability even upon persons not within its allegiances
for conduct outside its territory that has harmful consequences within its territory."
Castel, supra note 2, at 29.
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 10.
IIId,
[Vol. 19:149
WOOD PULP CASE
him, eventually finding him guilty of manslaughter.' 2 The French
government protested the subjection of its national to proceedings in
the Turkish courts for an act that occurred outside Turkish territory.' 3
After failing to resolve the dispute, the French and Turkish govern-
ments turned to the Permanent Court of International Justice with
the question whether the Turkish exercise of jurisdiction over the
French national violated principles of international law. ' 4 The Court
found no violation and concluded that international law, "[flar from
laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not
extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts
to persons, property, and acts outside their territory .... leaves them
in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in
certain cases by prohibitive rules."' 5 The Court held that assertions
of extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons were legitimate when a
constituent element of the person's actions occurred or an adverse
effect of those actions existed within that nation.' 6
The desire of nations and international organizations to control
and regulate global trade has triggered assertions of Lotus-type ju-
risdiction for the application to foreign legal persons of national laws
governing restrictive business practices. 7 The actions of several nations
in this regard and the responses thereto have substantially impacted
the formulation and application of EC competition law.' 8 Three of
the most influential states are the United States and two EC Member
States, the Federal Republic of Germany (Germany) and the United
Kingdom.
A. The United States
The Sherman Antitrust Act' 9 and its interpretation by American
courts make up a substantial portion of United States antitrust law.
12 Id. at 11.
13 Id. at 6-8.
14 Id. at 12.
,1 Id. at 19.
16 Id. at 23.
'1 Castel, supra note 2, at 29.
,8 The impact of United States law on the development of Community law is
generally acknowledged. See, e.g., Dara, Antitrust Law in the European Community
and the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 47 LA. L. REv. 761, 764 (1987).
19 15 U.S.C. § 1, et. seq. (1890). "In the anti-trust field the courts have been
accorded, by common consent, an authority they have in no other branch of enacted
law." United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348 (D. Mass
1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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Section (1) of the Act prohibits "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations .... "20
The act affords the courts broad substantive jurisdiction to address
all restraints of trade, both domestic and foreign.2' The courts, in
cases brought by the Antitrust Division of the United States De-
partment of Justice and by individuals with standing under the Act,
have played a crucial role in defining the jurisdictional reach of the
Act. 22
The Supreme Court of the United States received its first antitrust
case involving foreign commerce in 1909 in the form of a private
action. The case, American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., arose
out of allegations brought by American Banana that the United Fruit
Co. had deprived American Banana of the opportunity to grow fruit
in Costa Rica and Panama for sale in the United States. 23 American
Banana sought damages under the Sherman Act for the exclusively
foreign anticompetitive activity of United Fruit.24
The Supreme Court, in refusing to find jurisdiction, characterized
American Banana's assertions as "startling" and "surprising". 21 Util-
izing the "Conflict of Laws" notion that the "character of an act
as unlawful must be determined wholly by the Law of the country
where the act is done ... ,,26 the Court declared that the principle
of comity and non-interference precluded application of "prima facia
territorial" legislation to activity occurring within the territory of
another state. 21 The Court thus refused to apply the Sherman Act to
the foreign activities of United Fruit, and thereby reaffirmed its
historical adherence to the doctrine of territoriality. 28
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
The explicit language of the Act indicates that at a minimum the statute "reaches
beyond the water's edge to some extent." The courts' role has been to determine
how far. 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
22 (2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 1988).
22 J. MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 20 (1986).
23 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 355.
26 Id. at 356.
27 Id. at 357.
28 Justice Story, writing for the majority in The Apollon, stated: "The laws of
no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its
own citizens." 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824). The United States Supreme Court
gave constitutional approval to the territorial principle of jurisdiction by drawing
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WOOD PULP CASE
Almost forty years later, the United States Court of Appeals in
the ALCOA case abandoned the territorial definition of jurisdiction
to apply the Sherman Act to activities engaged in outside U.S. ter-
ritory. 29 In an action brought by the United States government, the
Court found one of two agreements entered into in Switzerland by
foreign corporations to be in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.30
The agreements limited the amounts of aluminum each of the parties
could sell.3 Judge Learned Hand, writing for the Court, held it was
"settled law . . . that any state may impose liabilities, even upon
persons not within its allegiance, for conduct [occurring] outside its
borders that has consequences within its borders which the state
reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recog-
nize. ' '3 2 Judge Hand was aware that "international complications
[were] likely to arise" if the Sherman Act was held to extend beyond
intentional activity and to cover mere repercussions of foreign ac-
tivity.3 Concluding that Congress had never intended the Sherman
Act to have such an expansive reach, Judge Hand promulgated a
two part test for determining the scope of its application: first, the
parties must intend to affect United States commerce by their agree-
ment; and second, the agreement must have an actual effect on United
States commerce. 4 The ALCOA holding is generally considered the
classic formulation of the effects doctrine.35
Foreign governments and commentators vigorously challenged Judge
Hand's assertion in ALCOA that the effects doctrine is "settled
law". 3 6 Criticism focused on the ALCOA Court's going beyond United
an analogy between the relations of the individual states of the United States to
those between individual nations. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
29 The Justices of the Supreme Court could not muster a quorum. Therefore,
the Supreme Court certified the case for a hearing by a panel of the Second Circuit.
148 F.2d 426, 421 (2d Cir. 1945).
30 Id. at 444-45.
11 Id. at 442.
32 Id. at 443.
33 Id.
", Id. at 443-44. Sufficiency of effect affording jurisdiction should not be confused
with sufficiency of effect establishing liability. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 415 reporters' Note 3 (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
31 RESTATEMENT, supra note 34.
36 In 1959, then State Department Legal Adviser Loftus E. Becker reported that
"there are a number of friendly foreign governments, foreign officials, and even
foreign courts, which believe strongly-or even passionately . . .- that [ALCOA and
similar cases constitute] a violation and infringement" of international law and
sovereignty." Becker, The Antitrust Law and Relations with Foreign Nations, 40
U.S. Dept. State Bull. 272-73 (1959).
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States precedent and the practice of other nations." A judicial re-
sponse to this criticism came from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America.3" Timberlane, a
United States corporation, brought four separate actions, including
one under the Sherman Antitrust Act, in which it alleged that the
Bank of America and others had conspired to prevent Timberlane
from milling lumber in Honduras and exporting it to the United
States. a9
Timberlane had sought to establish lumber operations in Honduras
for export to the United States.40 Companies that already had estab-
lished operations in Honduras responded unfavorably to the prospect
of increased competition. Timberlane eventually ceased operation due
to economic harassment and actions taken against its employees. 4'
This conspiracy, Timberlane asserted, "directly and substantially af-
fected the foreign commerce of the United States." '42
In reversing the District Court's dismissal of Timberlane's antitrust
complaint, 43 Judge Choy relegated the "effects" determination to the
status of a threshold consideration." Judge Choy promulgated a three-
part test for extraterritorial applications of the Sherman Act. The
elements of the test were: first, whether some effect, intended or
unintended, on American commerce existed; second, whether United
States antitrust law contemplated the particular restraint, in terms of
magnitude and type, as a violation; and third, whether the United
States' interests were sufficiently strong to justify an assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 4
17 Atwood, supra note 21, at 156-59.
38 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
19 Id. at 601.
- Id.
41 Id. at 604-05.
42 Id. at 605.
41 The District Court dismissed Timberlane's complaint on two grounds: "[The
Court] is prohibited under the act of state doctrine from examining the acts of a
foreign sovereign state; and in any event, that there is no direct and substantial
effect on United States foreign commerce." Id. at 601.
" "An effect on United States commerce, although necessary to the exercise of
jurisdiction under the antitrust laws, is alone not a sufficient basis on which to
determine whether American authority should be asserted in a given case as a matter
of international comity and fairness." Id. at 613. (Emphasis added).
41 Id. The Timberlane test underwent further judicial elaboration in Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. where the Third Circuit Court of Appeals listed
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The Timberlane test requires that the court conduct an analysis of
possible competing interests of different nations in determining Whether
the court should apply United States law or decline jurisdiction.1
While acknowledged to be a better test than that of "effect" alone,47
this interest balancing or jurisdictional rule of reason has received
substantial academic as well as judicial condemnation. 48 Judge Wilkey,
in Laker v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,49 criticized judicial interest
balancing in this situation on the grounds that a court is not capable
of properly balancing the interests of the United States against those
of a state that is often not represented before the court.50 Diplomacy
and negotiations by the Executive Branch, Judge Wilkey asserted,
best serve that purpose." Professor Mann expressed similar sentiments
ten factors it considered in determining whether to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared
to that abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its
foreseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction
and grants relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of
being forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be under
conflicting requirements by both countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if
made by the foreign nation under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nation has addressed the issue.
595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979).
46 Id., see ATWOOD, supra note 21, at 159-161.
' Mann, supra note 6, at 89.
48 ATWOOD, supra note 21, § 6.11 (Supp. 1988); Mann, supra note 6, at 87-91.
49 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
50 Judge Wilkey stated:
The resources of the Judiciary are inherently limited when faced with an
affirmative decision by the political branch of the government to prescribe
specific policies. Absent an explicit directive from Congress, this court has
neither the authority nor the institutional resources to weigh the policy and
political factors that must be evaluated when resolving competing claims
of jurisdiction.
Id. at 955.
SI Id. Judge Wilkey continued:
In contrast [to the judiciary], diplomatic and executive channels are, by
definition, designed to exchange, negotiate, and reconcile the problems which
accompany the realization of national interests within the sphere of inter-
1989]
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in calling interest balancing a judicial consideration of essentially
political factors.12 Mann concluded that legal analysis should address
"contacts" as opposed to interests. 3 Finally, the Justice Department
has taken the position that the executive branch, and not the courts,
should balance US and foreign governmental interests when neces-
sary.54
In 1982, President Reagan signed into law the Foreign Trade An-
titrust Improvement Act which adopted the "direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect" standard for determining the extra-
territorial applicability of § 1 of the Sherman Act."5 The Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States has incor-
porated this test into its jurisdictional rule of reasonableness as one
factor in determining the permissible scope of prescriptive jurisdic-
tion 5 6
B. The Federal Republic of Germany
German restrictive practices law grew out of the efforts of the
United States and the United Kingdom to dismantle the large industrial
cartels, syndicates, and trusts that had supported the Nazi war effort.5 7
While the Allied efforts had little practical effect with respect to this
goal, they did establish a free market legacy which the West German
government fully embraced.5
The West German antitrust law, the Act Against Restraints on
Competition (GWB),59 contains both substantive standards proscribing
certain anticompetitive activity ° and a jurisdictional standard defining
national associations. These forums should ... be utilized to avoid or
resolve conflicts caused by contradictory assertions of concurrent prescriptive
jurisdiction.
52 Mann, supra note 71, at 31.
11 Id. Mann asserts that courts should refrain from addressing subjective or
political interests and should instead apply an "objective test of the closeness of
connection, of a sufficiently weighty point of contact between the facts and their
legal assessment."
14 ATWOOD, supra note 21, § 6.11 (Supp. 1988).
11 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982).
516 RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 403.
51 Federal Republic of Germany, B5 World Comp. L. (MB) pt. 9, § 1.03[1] at
1-14 (1982).
58 Id. at 1-20.
19 Id. at 1-23, § 1.03[2]. GWB is an abbreviation of the act in German, Gesetz
gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen.
See GWB §§ 1-8, 25(1) (W. Ger.), reprinted in World Comp. L., supra note
57, at app.I (addressing horizontal restraints on competition).
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the scope of application of the substantive rules. 61 The basic goal of
the GWB is to maintain the competitive market structure of the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and to ensure that all enterprises
have free access to the market. 62 To further this purpose, the FRG
has adopted a mixed system of administration and adjudication. 63
West German law assigns policy judgments to the administrative body
and vests the application of binding law in the judiciary.6
Section 98(2) of the GWB contains an expansive jurisdictional
standard: "This Act shall apply to all restraints of competition which
have effect in the area to which this Act applies, even if they result
from acts done outside the area to which this Act applies.' 65 (emphasis
added). The Federal Supreme Court has held that section 98(2) extends
the application of the substantive provisions of the GWB to extra-
territorial activity, but only if the specific provisions of GWB pro-
scribe the domestic effect of that activity."6 Intent to affect competition
alone will not create a sufficient nexus upon which to establish
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the determinative factor in deciding whether
to apply the provisions of the GWB is the domestic effect resulting
from the proscribed conduct, not the location of the parties or the
conduct producing the effect. 6
7
Article 25 of the West German Constitution incorporates the general
rules of public international law into West German federal law. 68
Recognizing the restrictions that international law places on its ability
to apply the GWB extraterritorially, 69 the Court requires the existence
of a reasonable link between the domestic effect and the foreign
61 Id. at § 98(2).
62 Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 57, § 2.02[l], at 5.
63 MAXEINER, supra note 22, at 8.
64 Id. at 14. While policy questions enter into the legal interpretation of statutes,
Maxeiner feels that policy judgments should not be made in the application of
statutes.
65 GWB, supra note 60, § 98(2).
6 Steinberger, The German Approach, in EXTRA-TERRITORiAL APPLICATION OF
LAWS AND RESPONSEs THERETO 77, 82 (C.J. Olmstead ed. 1984) [hereinafter Stein-
berger] (discusses Judgment of 12 July 1973, Federal Supreme Court for Civil Cases,
Wu W/E BGH 1267, also known as Oilfield Pipes case).
67 Id. at 82-83 (discussing Judgment of 29 May 1979, Federal Supreme Court for
Civil Cases, Wu W/E BGH 1613, also known as Organic Pigments); Business
Organizations, 16G Antitrust L. and Trade Reg. (MB) § 66.0215] (1988).
68 Steinberger, supra note 66, at 85.
69 Id. at 84-86 (discusses Judgment of the Federal Cartel Office of 23 September
1980, WuW/E BKartA 1837; Judgments of the Court of Appeals of Berlin of 26
November 1980 - Kart 17/80 - (Synthetic Rubber I - principal case), WuW/E OLG
2411; Kart 18/80 - (Synthetic Rubber II - preliminary relief), WuW/E OLG 2419).
1989]
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undertaking under section 98(2) GWB to establish the applicability
of the substantive provisions. Such an application in the absence of
this link would constitute a violation of the general rules of public
international law. 70
C. The United Kingdom
The territoriality principle continues to define the jurisdictional
scope of United Kingdom competition law and to form the basis of
the United Kingdom's reaction to the extraterritorial application of
competition laws by other states. In 1976, the British Parliament
enacted legislation requiring registration of all agreements affecting
goods, services, and information entered into by two or more persons
"conducting business" within the United Kingdom. 7' The registration
requirement under the Restrictive Trade Practices Act (RTPA) of
1976 does not extend to foreign parties engaged in proscribed activity
which merely affects the United Kingdom, or to situations in which
a citizen of the United Kingdom enters into such an agreement with
foreign parties. 72 To be subject to this legislation, persons must engage
in direct business activity within the territory of the United Kingdom. 3
Under the RTPA, production, supply or processing of goods within
the United Kingdom is sufficient evidence that an undertaking is
"conducting business" within the United Kingdom. 74 Jurisdiction
therefore depends on two factors: first, the existence of facts sufficient
to establish that a person is conducting business within the United
Kingdom; and second, the location where the parties conducted sales
or entered into a contract of sale.7 1
The diplomatic response of the United Kingdom to the EC Com-
mission's application of EC competition law in Imperial Chemical
Industries Ltd. v. Commission of the European Communities 6 (Im-
70 Id. at 86-89.
7 Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1976, ch. 34, §§ 1(7), 6, 7, 11, and 12, reprinted
in 4 World Comp. L. (MB) app.I (1981) [hereinafter RTPAJ. A finding that an
agreement is registerable raises a presumption that it is contrary to public interests.
Whether the parties can rebut this presumption forms the basis of litigation before
the Restrictive Practices Court. R. MEKIN & K. WILLIAMS, COMPETITION LAW:
ANTITRUST POLICY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EEC 35-36 (1984).
72 MERKIN, supra note 71, at 469.
71 RTPA, supra note 71, § 6(1).
74 Id.
7 Business Organizations, supra note 67, 66.02[4]. The first part of this test is
very similar to the "contacts" test advocated by Mann. See supra note 53.
76 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 619; see infra note 102 and accompanying text.
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perial Chemical) case echoes the territorial requirements of the British
legislation.7 7 The British government objected to the Commission's
application of Community competition law to a U.K.-based under-
taking because the Commission did so without finding that a con-
stituent element of the alleged offense occurred within the Community.7"
The government of the United Kingdom argued that only the terri-
toriality principle "justifies proceedings against foreigners and foreign
companies . . . in respect of conduct which consists in whole or in
part of some ACTMTY by them in the territory of the State claiming
jurisdiction." 79 The United Kingdom maintains that a state should
not exercise jurisdiction against "a foreigner who or a foreign com-
pany which has committed no act within its territory. ' 80
The government of the United Kingdom carried its policy of ter-
ritoriality one step further with the passage of the Protection of
Trading Interests Act of 1980.1 This act has the effect of frustrating
foreign discovery processes by authorizing the Secretary of State of
the United Kingdom to prohibit British businesses from complying
with foreign discovery orders.82 In applying this act, the Secretary
must only consider whether the proposed or implemented proceedings
threaten to damage the trading interests of the United Kingdom.83
In 1983, the British Secretary of State issued such an order to
prevent British air carriers from complying with a request for doc-
uments stemming from the Laker v. Sabena14 case in a U.S. court. 5
11 Aide-Memoire, supra note 2, at 311-12.
78 Id. at 311. The United Kingdom did not join the EC until January 1, 1973.
Therefore, the UK company involved was a foreign-based undertaking.
The Chancery Division in Registrar v. Schweppes echoed the principle objection to
imputation expressed in the Aide-Memoire. This opinion addressed the single eco-
nomic unit or entity doctrine of parent-subsidiary relations in the context of RTPA.
The Court stated: "[I f, after counting as one any parties to it which are inter-
connected bodies corporate, one still finds that restrictions relating exclusively to
the goods supplied are accepted as between two or more persons by whom the goods
are to be supplied, § 7(2) [of the RTPA] does not apply." [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1148,
1169, [1971] 2 All Eng. Rep. 1473, 1488. The Court concluded that the legislature
did not intend the provision of the RTPA to treat a foreign company and its UK
subsidiary as a single entity. Id.
79 Aide-Memoire, supra note 2, at 313 (emphasis added).
:0 Id.
SI Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. II, relevant sections reprinted
in Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading
Interests Act, 75 A.J.I.L. 257, 273-280 (1981) [hereinafter P.T.I.A.J.
:2 Id. at 273.
83 MERKIN, supra note 71, at 477.
731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
85 British Airways Board v. Laker Airways, Ltd., [1984] 3 W.L.R. 413, 427,
[1984] 3 All Eng. Rep. 39, 50.
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The suit addressed Laker Airway's claim for treble damages for harm
resulting from the predatory pricing activities of British Airways and
other members of the International Air Transport Association. 86 The
House of Lords rejected Laker's challenge to the Secretary of State's
actions. 7 The British statute gives the Secretary the discretion to
apply the 1980 Act to circumstances involving international relations, 8
and the House of Lords therefore placed a substantial burden on
the challenger of a blocking order by the Secretary of State to show
that "no reasonable person holding the office of minister ...could
have reached [the same conclusion]." 9 The Protection of Trading
Interests Act thus affords the Secretary of State broad powers to
frustrate almost any action against a British business if the Secretary
deems the action, or a request for information pursuant to it, a
threat to British trade or industry.9
D. The European Community
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome9' form the foundation
of EC competition law. Article 85(1) prohibits undertakings from
entering into bilateral and multilateral agreements which may or do
adversely effect interstate commerce. 92 Since the Treaty of Rome is
the engendering document of the EEC, the European Court of Justice
has considered Article 85(1) in the broader context of the goals of
the European Economic Community,93 namely market integration.9
id.
87 [1984] 3 W.L.R. 413, 431-32, [1984] 3 All Eng. Rep. 39, 54-55.
" P.T.I.A., supra note 81, at 273.
99 [1984] 3 W.L.R. 413, 432, [1984] 3 All Eng. Rep. 39, at 55.
9 This result is achieved through "the combined operation of section 1 [of the
PTIA] and a claim for an injunction by the defendant in the English courts."
MERKIN, supra note 71, at 478.
11 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3, 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. Given the differences in translations,
the version published by the European Communities is treated as authoritative for
the purposes of this paper. OFICE FOR OmcIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUITIES, TREATIES ESTABLISHNG TmE EUROPEAN COMMUNITES 331 (1978). Anal-
ysis of EEC competition policy will address only the provisions of the treaty involved
in the Wood Pulp case, Article 85(1).
92 Id. at art. 85.
91 Commercial Solvents v. Commission, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 223, 252;
see also A. CAMPBELL, EC COMPETITION LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S TEXTBOOK 18-20,
84-85 (1980).
14 In Commercial Solvents, the ECJ stated that Community competition laws
must be interpreted and applied in the context of Articles 2 and 3(f) of the Treaty
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Article 85(1) prohibits practices deemed incompatible with these
goals. 95 The proscribed practices include all agreements between un-
dertakings, all decisions of associations of undertakings, and all
concerted practices of undertakings that are likely to affect commerce
between Member States and have as their object or consequence
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Com-
mon Market. 96
The Treaty of Rome charges the EC Commission with the direct
and active role of ensuring "that the provisions of this Treaty and
measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied. '97
In 1962, the EC Council adopted Regulation 17 which conferred upon
the Commission additional means of enforcing Community compe-
tition law. Article 17 of the Regulation affords the Commission the
power to enforce, by means of fines and periodic penalty payments,
the obligations imposed upon undertakings by the Treaty.98 The Com-
of Rome. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 223, 252. Article 2 states:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market,
and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States,
to promote through the Community a harmonious development of economic
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an
accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between
the States belonging to it.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 91, art. 2.
Article 3(f) of the Treaty mandates "the institution of a system ensuring that
competition in the market is not distorted." Id. at art. 3(f).
91 Id. at art. 85(1). Article 85(1) states:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all
agreements between undertakings, decision by associations of undertakings and con-
certed practices which may effect trade between member states and which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase of selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or in-
vestment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such con-
tracts.
Id. at art. 85(1).
96 Id.
11 Id. at art. 155.
91 Council Regulations 17 Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 5 J.O.
COMM. EUR. 204 (1962).
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mission may pursue alleged infringements of Community law upon
its own initiative or upon application by Member States or "natural
or legal persons who claim a legitimate interest." 99 The Commission
has vigorously exercised this power and has in turn adopted an
expansive view of the scope of application of Article 85(1).' 0
In the field of competition law, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) serves an appellate function. The Court reviews decisions of
the Commission brought before the Court under Article 173 of the
Treaty of Rome.' 01 While the Court has generally agreed with the
results of Commission decisions concerning the extension of Article
85(1) prohibitions to foreign-based undertakings, 10 2 the Court has
based its affirmations on the EC's right to prescribe and apply its
competition rules within its territory, as opposed to extraterritori-
ally. 103
The ECJ has avoided assessing the extraterritorial reach of EEC
competition laws by imputing the conduct of a subsidiary found
within the Community to its foreign-based parent company. °4 . The
Court's treatment of this issue began with Imperial Chemical in which
the Commission alleged that Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), a
foreign-registered undertaking, had engaged in concerted practices
within the EC by dictating pricing instructions to its wholly owned
subsidiary incorporated within the EC. 10 5 The Commission supported
jurisdiction on three related theories: first, that ICI had actually been
engaged in the concerted practices by dictating pricing to its EC-
based subsidiary which acted merely as ICI's agent; second, that ICI
99 Id. at art.3.
"00 See generally CAMPBELL, supra note 93, at 39-77.
,01 Article 173 affords the Court broad review of the legality of acts of the
Commission and Council other than recommendations and opinions. Any natural
of legal person may institute proceedings against a Commission decision directed
against that person, or in which that person has a direct and individual concern.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 91, art. 173.
102 See, e.g. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. Commission of the European
Communities, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 619.
103 Id.
104 In the Dyestuffs case, the European Court of Justice imputed the activity of
a Community based subsidiary to its foreign based parent company. The grounds
for imputation included: (1) the subsidiary's failure to act autonomously in making
decisions, (2) the ownership by the parent company of a majority of the subsidiary's
shares, and (3) the actual exercise by the parent of "decisive influence over the
policy of the subsidiar[y] as regards selling prices in the Common Market." Id. at
662.
101 ICI was one among 10 undertakings found in violation of Article 85 by the
Commission of the EC. Id.
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was present in the EC because of its corporate control over its
subsidiary; and third, that the activity of ICI produced effects within
the Common Market. 1° 6 The Court based its decision on the second
theory and thereby avoided addressing the Commission's application
of the effects doctrine. 10 7 The Court found that ICI had a presence
in the Community through ICI's control of its non-independent EC
subsidiary. 08 The presence of ICI within the Community established
the domestic jurisdiction of the Commission under the territoriality
doctrine. Basing jurisdiction on territoriality allowed the Court to
avoid considering the extraterritorial application of EC competition
law,' °9 and thus the consideration of the relationship between Com-
munity competition law and public international law.
III. ANALYsIs
On December 19, 1984, the Commission found forty-one wood
pulp producers and two of their trade associations in violation of
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome." 0 The infringements included 1)
announced concerted prices for delivery to the EC and actual trans-
action prices charged in the EC;"' 2) Kraft Export Association (KEA)
pricing recommendations and the exchange of individualized data,
based on KEA rules, concerning prices for wood pulp deliveries;" 2
and 3) the exchange of pricing data within the framework of the
Research and Information Center for the European Pulp and Paper
Industry run by Fides of Switzerland." 3 The Commission found that
the wood pulp producers and their cartels had created an artificially
101 2 J.O. COMM. EUR. L. (No. L 195) 4 (1969), 1969 Comm. Mkt. L. R. D23;
D. GOYDER, EEC COMPETITION LAW 386 (1988).
-07 While acknowledging that in form subsidiaries enjoy a separate legal identity
from their parent companies, the court concluded that under those specific circum-
stances "the formal separation between [the subsidiary and parent company], resulting
from their separate legal personality, cannot outweigh [sic] the unity of their conduct
on the market for the purpose of applying the rules on competition." 1972 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 619, 663.
,o Id. at 663.
1o9 GOYDER, supra note 106, at 388.
11o 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 85) 1 (1985).
"I Id. at 26, art.l(l) & (2).
112 Id. at art. 1(3). The U.S. pulp producers involved were members of the Pulp,
Paper, and Paperboard Export Association of the United States, formerly named
the Kraft Export Association (KEA) (this abbreviation is still used in the industry,
was used in the Commission and Court decisions, and will be used throughout this
paper). Id. at 6, para. 28.
"I Id. at 26, art. 1 (4).
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transparent market by their concerted activities which affected com-
petition between the Member States." 4 The Commission then imposed
fines on thirty-six of the forty-three addressees pursuant to Regulation
17.115
Several wood pulp producers and two wood pulp trade associations,
all having their registered offices outside the Community, brought
actions in the European Court of Justice under Article 173 of the
Treaty of Rome seeking the annulment of the Commission decision. 116
The Court consolidated the actions and then bifurcated the proceed-
ings following its decision to address challenges to the Community's
prescriptive jurisdiction over undertakings established in non-EC
member countries first. 117
A. ECJ Decision
In a characteristically brief opinion, the ECJ for the first time
upheld the jurisdiction of the Commission to apply EC competition
law directly to foreign undertakings on grounds other than impu-
tation." 8 The applicants claimed that the Commission decision vio-
lated public international law." 9 The Commission, the applicants
alleged, had based its application of Community competition law
"exclusively on the economic repercussions within the Common Mar-
ket of conduct restricting competition which was adopted outside the
Community."120 The Court, in rejecting this challenge, concluded that
,11 Id. at 15, para 85.
" Id. at 27, art. 3(1).
116 Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A. Ahlstraam Oy v. E. C. Commission, [1988] 4 Comm.
Mkt. L. R. 901 (1988).
"7 These initial proceedings also addressed a challenge by Finnish wood pulp
producers to the application of Article 85 based on an assertion that trade relations
between the Community and the Finnish producers are regulated exclusively by a
Free Trade Agreement. This, the Finnish producers asserted, precluded application
of the Community competition rules. The Court upheld the Commission's decision
finding Community law applicable on grounds that the articles of the Free Trade
Agreement "presuppose that the Contracting Parties have rules which enable them
to take action against agreements which they regard as being incompatible with that
Agreement." The Commission concluded, and the Court affirmed, "those rules can
only be the provisions of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty." Id. at 943. The ECJ
had not issued a decision on the substantive challenges to the Commission decision
at the time this paper was completed.
"I Id. at 939. When asked by the author of this note whether the Court had in
fact adopted the "effects" doctrine, Judge Joliet, judge rapporteur of the Wood
Pulp decision, responded emphatically in the negative.
9 Id. at 939-40.
1I0 Id. at 941.
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the decisive factor in assessing the territorial scope of Article 85 is
the place of implementation of the anti-competitive agreement, de-
cision or concerted practice, not the place where the parties formed
the agreement, decision or concerted practice.12l
Unlike the statutes of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
United States, the Treaty of Rome does not establish a separate
standard for jurisdiction.12 2 Article 85(1)'addresses "agreements be-
tween undertakings, decisions by association of undertakings and
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition within the common market. ' 1 23 The
Commission, unlike the Court, has distilled a broad standard of
jurisdiction based on the language of Article 85. The Commission
stated in its Wood Pulp decision that
Article 85 ... applies to restrictive practices which MAY AFFECT
trade between Member States even if the undertakings and associ-
ations which are parties to the restricted practices are established
or have their headquarters outside the Community, and even if the
restrictive practices in question also affect markets outside the EEC.'2
From the Commission's perspective, EC competition law operates in
a consistent manner regardless of whether the actors are domestic or
foreign undertakings. This perspective has two results. First, a po-
tential effect on trade between the Member States creates a sufficient
nexus between the foreign undertakings and the Community upon
which to base jurisdiction. Second, the existence of effects within
another jurisdiction resulting from the same activity has no bearing
on the Commission's claim of jurisdiction.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE WOOD PULP DECISION
While the Court's decision represents an expansion of the permis-
sible scope of Commission application of Community competition
law, the Court refrained from expressly adopting the expansive stan-
dard of jurisdiction afforded by the "may affect" language of Article
85. The Court instead established a purportedly more restrictive stan-
dard than the Commission. The Wood Pulp standard consists of two
121 Id.
122 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
123 Id.
124 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 85) para. 79, at 14-15 (1985). (Emphasis added).
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essential elements. The first element is the existence of an agreement,
decision or concerted practice entered into by two or more under-
takings. 25 The second element consists of the actual implementation
within the EC of the agreement, decision or concerted practice. 26
The second element, implementation, signals a marked departure
in the theoretical basis of EC jurisdiction. Formerly, as evidenced
by the Imperial Chemical case, the Court based jurisdiction on finding
that the undertakings engaged in activity within the EC, either directly
or through the activity of a non-independent EC based subsidiary. 27
By contrast, the Court in the Wood Pulp case based jurisdiction not
on actual activity within the EC but on the fact of implementation
within the EC of the agreement, decision or concerted practice. 28
The Court, however, in promulgating this standard, left unsettled
two related issues: what constitutes "implementation", and what role
does international law play in this standard?
A. Territoriality
The Court stated that "the Community's jurisdiction to apply its
competition rules [under the facts of this case] is covered by the
territoriality principle as universally recognized in public international
law." 29 Territoriality traditionally allows the sovereign to address a
physical presence, activity or conduct within its territory. 30 In Wood
Pulp, the Court based jurisdiction on finding that the foreign un-
dertakings implemented their pricing agreements within the Com-
munity. The common definition of "implement" is "to carry into
effect."'' As a territorial standard of jurisdiction, implementation
would therefore appear to require some constituent act or conduct
within the Community which carries the concerted pricing scheme
into effect. Yet the Court did not clearly define what implementation
means.
The Court, however, did emphasize several central elements or
conclusions based on the facts of this case. First, the main sources
of supply of wood pulp were outside the Community. 3 2 Second, the
125 [19881 4 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 901, 941 (1988).
126 Id.
127 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
,21 [1988] 4 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 901, 941 (1988).
129 Id.
130 RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 402 and comment c; Mann, supra note 7, at
20.
'3, WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 705 (2d ed. 1979).
32 [1988] 4 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 901, 940 (1988).
[Vol. 19:149
WOOD PULP CASE
foreign wood pulp producers sold directly to purchasers established
in the Community.' Third, the wood pulp producers engaged in
Article 85 competition within the Common Market by engaging in
competitive pricing in order to win orders from EC purchasers. 3 4
Fourth, producers concerted on the prices to be charged to customers
within the EC.35 Fifth, producers placed the concerted prices into
effect by selling at the coordinated prices. 3 6
From these factors, the Court concluded that the implementation
occurred within the EC. But not one of the five factors contains any
reference to defined acts or conduct within the territory of the EC.
In fact, all of these elements could have, and in one case allegedly
did, occur outside the territory of the EC. 137
The Court's view of territoriality is much broader than that of the
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom, which intervened in favor
of the Commission in several of the Wood Pulp cases, supported
basing jurisdiction on three possible grounds: first, upon finding an
undertaking has its registered office within the Community; second,
upon finding the foreign-based undertaking liable for the conduct of
its EC-based subsidiaries; or third, by imputing the activity of an
agent within the EC to the foreign-based undertakings dictating its
actions.'38 Under the United Kingdom view, the determinative factor
is whether an undertaking gave effect to the agreement within the
Community. But the United Kingdom, unlike the Court, defined
"giving effect" or implementation as the activities within the Com-
munity of the foreign based undertakings' EC based agents.3 9
"I Id. at 941.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Weldwood of Canada, Ltd. (case 126/85) alleged that "it did not ever 'do
business' in the Community in any real sense since its decisions on the pricing of
its products were made in Canada and sales of its products were concluded in that
country." This applicant continued by arguing that only under the "effects" doctrine
could the Community claim to exercise jurisdiction over them. [Part III of the
Report of the Hearing which contains the parties' submissions is on file at the EC
publications office in Washington, D.C. but has been omitted from the Common
Market Law Reports report of the case. For this reason, all references to the
Submissions of the Parties will be cited to the Report of the Hearing available from
the EC office] Report of the Hearing at 26.
"I' Id. at 31. In Imperial Chemical, the Court adopted only the parent/subsidiary
liability rationale for imputing activity within the EC to undertakings established
outside the EC. 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 619, 663. See supra note 102 and
accompanying text.
,39 Report of the Hearing, supra note 136, at 31.
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The Court, however, clearly stated that "it is immaterial [whether
a foreign based undertaking] had recourse to subsidiaries, agents,
subagents, or branches within the Community."4° The Court did not
share Britain's concern for establishing the existence of activity, either
directly or imputedly, within the territory of the entity asserting
jurisdiction. Rather, the Court appeared to have established juris-
diction on a "reasonable links" standard akin to that which the
German courts promulgated to mitigate the broad scope of the West
German statutory "effect" standard,' 4' although the ECJ did not
articulate the standard in this way.
The five factor analysis suggests that the Court will uphold juris-
diction whenever the Commission can establish sufficient links be-
tween a party or its activities and the Community. In the context of
global markets, the European Community will consistently be able
to establish these links based on the sheer size of the EC alone. The
Community represents the economic interests of the twelve Member
States. The Commission, it appears, can now address almost any
alleged global pricing scheme under the claim that the scheme affects
competition among the Member States of the EC.
B. Effects
Although the Court claimed that the Commission's jurisdiction
based on implementation within the EC is commensurate with the
territoriality principle, the "implementation" standard bears a striking
resemblance to the effects doctrine as formulated in the ALCOA
case. 142 The effects doctrine addresses activity which has an intended
effect on trade.' 43 "Implementation" requires the existence of an
agreement, decision or concerted practice on prices that producers
will charge purchasers within the Community and the implementation
thereof within the Community.
The first element of the "implementation" test, the existence of
an agreement, decision or concerted practice, serves as an intent
requirement. The parties must have some desire to affect a pricing
scheme within the EC. For example, assuming Nation X is not a
Member State of the EC, a pricing agreement between foreign wood
pulp producers to affect the selling price of wood pulp in Nation X
140 [1988] Comm. Mkt. L. R. 901, 941 (1988).
,4, See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
142 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
143 Id.
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would theoretically not be subject to EC competition law even if the
sale price of wood pulp in Nation X had repercussions within the
Community. No intent to affect EC trade would exist, and imple-
mentation within the EC would not have occurred. The Court, how-
ever, offered no guidance for determining whether certain conduct
is intended to affect EC competition. Therefore, the Court could
find intent by concluding that foreign undertakings entering into an
agreement which has an effect on trade between the Member States
would have reasonably foreseen this result, thereby placing the burden
on the undertakings to rebut a heavy presumption of intent.144
The second element, implementation, is analogous to the ALCOA
"affect imports" requirement. The Court does not expressly define
the degree of involvement each undertaking must have had to be
deemed to have had a role in the implementation. De minimus effect,
however, appears sufficient to establish that an undertaking played
a role in implementation. One applicant argued that its share of the
market was so small that its activity alone could not have had any
significant effect on trade between Member States. 4 5 The Court's
implicit denial of this defense suggests that for the purposes of
jurisdiction the Court views as determinative the aggregate effect of
the implemented concerted pricing, and will not consider in isolation
the individual activity of each undertaking. 146
Although the Court did not expressly address the effects standard,
the Court afforded the Commission this opportunity. The Court asked
the Commission to respond to the following questions:
Does the Commission maintain that it has jurisdiction in these cases
by reason of conduct which has taken place within the Community
and, if so, what is that conduct? Or does it base its jurisdiction on
the effects within the Community of conduct which took place
outside the Community and, if so, what is that conduct and what
are its effects? 47
4 See, eg. Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice, Antitrust
Guide for International Operation 6 (1977).
,,1 Report of the Hearing, supra note 137, at 36.
146 In its substantive analysis as to whether agreements, decisions or practices have
anti-competitive effects in violation of article 85(1), the Court considers them "in
the context in which they occur, that is to say, in the economic and legal context
of such agreements, decisions or practices and where they might combine with others
to have a cumulative effect on competition. An agreement cannot be examined in
isolation from the above context." Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin-Janssens, 1976 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 407, 415.
"4 Report of the Hearing, supra note 137, at 45.
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The Commission's responses appear to have influenced the Court's
formulation of the "implementation" standard, and thus, its circum-
vention of the effects doctrine. The Commission distinguished between
conduct that distorts the competitive process in the Community and
conduct that, although it does not itself distort the competitive process
within the Community, produces such consequences. 148 The necessary
implementing conduct in which the undertakings in this case all
engaged was sales to EC purchasers. But as stated earlier, not all of
the applicant undertakings engaged in sales within the Community. 149
Therefore, it appears that the controlling factor is who the purchasers
were as opposed to where the sales agreement occurred. If foreign
undertakings enter into a pricing scheme directed at EC purchasers
and then sell to those purchasers at the agreed price, they have
implemented an agreement within the EC affecting Community trade,
regardless of the contractual terms, even if the contractual terms were
F.O.B seller's port.
C. Role of International Law
The Court's treatment of international law brings to mind the
proverbial placing the cart before the horse. The Court offered a
simplistic and unsatisfactory response to these issues. International
law, the Court concluded, has no impact on the question of adju-
dicatory jurisdiction in the Wood Pulp case. 50 The Court appears
to have based its dismissal of international law on this reasoning:
Implementation equals territoriality; Territoriality equals a sovereign's
right to apply law domestically; Domestic application of law precludes
international law; Therefore, implementation precludes the consid-
eration of international law. The Court thereby implicitly claimed to
be applying its laws domestically, rather than extraterritorially, to
conduct allegedly having occurred within its boarders.
Evidence of this rationale is especially apparent in the Court's
response to the applicants' assertion that the Commission's application
of Community law to address activity of foreign-based undertakings
occurring outside the EC fails to consider the international law prin-
ciples of comity and non-interference. The Court summarily dismissed
the comity argument, stating that "it suffices to observe that [comity]
amounts to calling in question the Community's jurisdiction to apply
148 Id.
,41 See supra note 137.
130 [1988] 4 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 901, 942 (1988).
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its competition rules to conduct such as that found to exist in this
case and that, as such, that argument has already been rejected." ''
The court claimed to have based its assertion of jurisdiction on
the territoriality principle. A finding that its jurisdiction is consistent
with the territoriality principle was essential to the validity of the
Court's treatment of international law because the Court used this
position to dismiss the comity argument, an issue which it should
have considered initially in deciding whether to extend jurisdiction.1 2
Although the Court also confronted the applicants' non-interference
objection after finding jurisdiction, the Court's response better ad-
dressed the issue raised by this objection than did its response to
comity.' 3 The applicants from the United States, all members of
United States wood pulp producers' trade association, claimed that
the Webb-Pomerene Act of the United States mandates the creation
of export cartels. They argued that EC proscription of this activity
therefore violated the principle of non-interference. The Court re-
sponded by defining circumstances which raise the non-interference
issue and then found that those circumstances did not exist in the
Wood Pulp case. 1 4 In so doing, the Court appears to have implicitly
balanced the United States policy of encouraging export trade against
the EC policy of ensuring undistorted competition between Member
States and to have predictably found the EC interest paramount.
D. The Role of Diplomacy
Professor Akehurst once wrote that "the acid test of the limits of
jurisdiction in international law is the presence or absence of dip-
lomatic protest."'5 This statement has special significance in the
context of extraterritorial applications of national competition laws.
Unilateral application invites international condemnation and national
retaliatory action. 56 Bilateral and multilateral consultation and con-
51 Id.
152 See, e.g. RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 403.
[ 119881 4 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 901, 941 (1988).
114 Non-interference, the Court stated, is "a rule according to which where two
States have jurisdiction to lay down and enforce rules and the effect of those rules
is that a person finds himself subject to contradictory orders as to the conduct he
must adopt, each State is obliged to exercise its jurisdiction with moderation." Id.
The Court dismissed the non-interference argument upon concluding that the Webb-
Pomerene Act "merely exempts the conclusion of export cartels from the application
of United States antitrust laws but does not require such cartels to be concluded."
Id. at 942.
Akehurst, supra note 3, at 176.
156 See, e.g. Lowe supra note 81.
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ciliation fosters applications of law, or restraint therefrom, consistent
with international law.'
5 7
Regardless of whether the basis of the implementation standard is
territoriality, as the Court holds, or effects as it appears to be,
diplomatic channels serve a crucial role in ensuring that assertions
of jurisdiction do not produce breaches of international law. The
Court pointed out that the Commission notified the United States
government, pursuant to Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) Recommendation of 25 October 1979, that
United States nationals were the subject of a Commission investi-
gation.'5 8 The United States raised no objection in its response to
the Commission's assertion of jurisdiction, thereby appearing to ac-
knowledge the Commission's right to address this conduct.5 9
The OECD recommendation contains voluntary guidelines which
entreat the country initiating proceedings to be mindful of its obli-
gation under international law to consider the legitimate interests of
other states. 16 The notification provision not only affords the state
of the foreign addressee the opportunity to articulate its concerns,
but also the opportunity "to take remedial action under its own law
to deal with the restrictive business practices."' 6' The recommendation
also recognizes that the ultimate decision whether to pursue enforce-
ment of national competition law rests exclusively with the sovereign
state alleging the existence of an infringement. 62
V. CONCLUSION
Whether the European Court of Justice has adopted the effects
doctrine as the Community standard of jurisdiction for addressing
the anticompetitive activity of foreign based undertakings is more
than a debate over mere semantics. By concluding that the jurisdiction
of the Commission to address this activity is consistent with the
" Castel supra note 2, at 93.
[1988] 4 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 901, 942 (1988). Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Recommendation of the Council: Co-operation Between
Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade,
19 Acts of the Organization 377 (Oct. 25, 1979), reprinted in Competition Law
Enforcement - International Co-operation in the Collection of Information 78 (1984)
[hereinafter OECD Recommendation].
119 [1988] 4 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 901, 942 (1988).
,60 OECD Recommendation, supra note 158, at 78.
161 Id. at 79.
162 Id.
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territoriality theory, the Court clearly sought to avoid the thorny
international law considerations raised by the extraterritorial appli-
cation of national law. As a result, however, the Court failed to use
the Wood Pulp case as a vehicle for establishing a clear Community
policy and standard. In essence, the Court has told the Commission,
''you may"; the Court has yet to tell the Commission whether and
when "you should".
Evan Breibart

